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intended by Congress to control featherbedding8 If Congress wants to control
featherbedding it would seem that the NLRB would be best suited to the task.
If, on the other hand, it is Congress' concern to control labor violence, there
would seem to be little justification for singling out violence associated with
featherbedding demands. In any event, the preservation of the peace has traditionally been a matter of state concern 1 and might well be left to the states.
81 But see Brown and Peer, The Anti-Racketeering Act: Labor and Management Weapon
Against Labor Racketeering, 32 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 965 (1957).
s1 See Youngdahl v. Rainfair, 355 U.S. 131 (1957); United Auto, A. & A.I.W. v. Wisconsin
Employment Relations Board, 351 U.S. 266 (1956).

STATE IMMUNITY STATUTES AND THE SCOPE OF THE
PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
In Knapp v. Schweitzer,' the Supreme Court decided that a witness appearing
in a state proceeding under a grant of immunity against possible self-incrimination is not privileged by the Fifth Amendment to decline to answer questions on
the ground of his reasonable apprehension of subsequent federal prosecution.
Accordingly, the Court sustained a New York contempt citation based on
Knapp's failure to reply to questions posed in the New York proceeding. The
impact of the Knapp case can be understood only in the light of related precedents.2 It has been held that a state immunity statute which does not protect the
witness against prosecution in another jurisdiction for the matters to which the
questions relate does not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and that the transcript of the witness' state testimony may be introduced against him in a federal prosecution without violating the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, unless there was "collusion"
between the two sovereigns. 4 These holdings, together with the Knapp case,
may place the state witness in an almost intolerable position. He may be faced
with a choice between a state contempt citation if he refuses to answer, a state
perjury conviction if he answers untruthfully, and a federal prosecution if he
answers truthfully.5 The harshness of this possible result has caused sharp divi1357 U.S. 371 (1958). The result was not unexpected. See Feldman v. United States, 322
U.S. 487 (1944); United States v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141 (1931); Jack v. Kansas, 199 U.S. 372
(1905).
2Feldman v. United States, 322 U.S. 487 (1944); United States v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141
(1931); Ensign v. Pennsylvania, 227 U.S. 592 (1913); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906); Jack
v. Kansas, 199 U.S. 372 (1905); I.C.C. v. Baird, 194 U.S. 25 (1904); Brown v. Walker, 161
U.S. 591 (1896); see Ableman v. Booth, 21 How. (U.S.) 506, 516 (1858). Contra: Ballman v.
Fagin, 200 U.S. 186 (1906); United States v. Saline Bank, 26 U.S. 100 (1828).
'Jack v. Kansas, 199 U.S. 372 (1905).
4 Feldman v. United States, 322 U.S. 487 (1944).
5Since the analysis will not be affected thereby, this comment will assume that the witness
has sound reason to fear subsequent prosecution. Although the Supreme Court, in its first
enunciation of the rule that a state immunity grant need not protect the witness against
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sion on the Court and has evoked vigorous criticism by the commentators.'
The witness' predicament is the result of two factors: the scope of the privilege as defined by the inquiring sovereign and the determination of the prosecuting sovereign as to its use of the testimony elicited by the inquiring sovereign.
A majority of the states which have addressed themselves to the first problem
have indicated that the state privilege is limited to self-incrimination under the
law of the inquiring sovereign. 8 The Supreme Court, in deciding that the testimony may be used by the federal sovereign in its role of prosecutor, 9 was influenced by the implications of our federal system. 10 The Tenth Amendment precludes the federal government from preventing a state grant of immunity on the
ground of an imminent federal prosecution of the witness; the Supremacy
Clause" naturally prevents the state from granting an immunity which will prevent a subsequent federal prosecution. Thus the interaction between the determination of the scope of the privilege and the determination as to possible uses
of the testimony creates tension between the purposes of the privilege against
self-incrimination and the demands of the federal system.
Recognizing this tension, the Supreme Court qualified its holding in Feldman
v. United States that the use of state compelled testimony in federal courts did
not violate the Fifth Amendment 2 by declaring that where the defendant in a
prosecution in another jurisdiction to be effective, based its decision in part on the fact that
there was no substantial danger of any subsequent federal prosecution, Jack v. Kansas, 199
U.S. 372 (1905), this ground was eliminated by the holding of Feldman v. United States, 322
U.S. 487, 493-94 (1944).
6 Knapp v. Schweitzer, 357 U.S. 371, 381-85 (1958) (dissenting opinions); Feldman v.
United States, 322 U.S. 487,497 (1944) (dissenting opinion); cf. Irvine v. California, 347 U.S.
128, 139-40 (1954) (dissenting opinion).
7
Grant, Federalism and Self-Incrimination, 4 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 549 (1957); Parsons, StateFederal Crossfire in Search and Seizure and Self-Incrimination, 42 Cornell L. Q. 346 (1957);
Boudin, The Immunity Bill, 42 Geo. L. J. 497 (1954); Does the Privilege against Self-Incrimination Extend to Incrimination under the Laws of Another Jurisdiction, 46 Ky. L. J. 281
(1958); Effect of Possible Federal Prosecution on Application of State Immunity Statute in
State Criminal Proceedings, 11 Vand. L. Rev. 199 (1957); Admissibility in a Federal Court of
Evidence Obtained under a State Immunity Statute, 53 Yale L. J. 364 (1944). The decision has
also been criticized by the lower federal courts, e.g., Marcello v. United States, 196 F.2d 437,
443 (C.A.5th, 1952). The rule has had its defenders. McCormick, Evidence §124 (1954);
Brownell, Immunity from Prosecution Versus Privilege against Self-Incrimination, 28 Tulane
L. Rev. 1 (1953). In the converse situation, at least one state has held that the use of testimony
compelled by a federal grant of immunity in a subsequent state prosecution violates the state
privilege against self-incrimination. Clark v. State, 68 Fla. 433, 67 So. 135 (1914).
88 Wigmore, Evidence §2258 (3d. ed., 1940); McCormick, Evidence §124 (1954).
9Feldman v. United States, 322 U.S. 487 (1944).
" U.S. Const. Art. 6, cl. 2.
1Id., at 490-91.
"322 U.S. 487 (1944). The witness' confession to the state authorities is not excluded by the
Fifth Amendment under the Feldman rule. Therefore, even though the witness may claim the
Fifth Amendment in his role as a federal defendant, his silence at that point does not protect
him against his own self-incriminating testimony. See Mr. Justice Black's dissenting opinion in
the Knapp case, 357 U.S. 371,382 (1958). Anticipating this result, at least one writer has urged
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federal prosecution could prove that federal officers had participated or cooperated with state officials to procure a state grant of immunity, testimony obtained as a result of that grant would be inadmissible in the federal courts.13
This qualification was based on an analogy 14 to the search and seizure cases
which subject the source of state-gathered evidence offered in federal courts to
federal standards when the Government is implicated in the state search.15 However, recent cases pointing to the conclusion that state gathered evidence which
violates federal standards may be excluded in federal courts even without federal
"collusion" seem to indicate the vulnerability of the federal-state dichotomy. 16
In Wolf v. Colorado'1 the Supreme Court declared

8

that the core of the Fourth

increasing use of the immunity grant to avoid the force of the privilege. Rapacz, Limiting the
Plea of Self-Incrimination and Recent Enlargement of the New York Immunity Statute, 20
Geo. L. 1. 329 (1932).
1' Feldman v. United States, 322 U.S. 487, 494 (1944).
14The Court relied on Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28 (1927) (federal participation in a
state search), and McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943) (exclusion of confession obtained by federal officers by incessant questioning before arraignment).
15
Evidence is excluded if a federal officer actually participates in the unlawful seizure, e.g.,
Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74 (1949); Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28 (1927); if the
search is made solely for the purpose of enforcing federal law, Gambino v. United States, 275
U.S. 310 (1927); Lowrey v. United States, 128 F.2d 477 (C.A.8th, 1942); if the Government
delegates authority to state police and accepts prosecution of case according to a pre-arranged
understanding, thereby ratifying the-means whereby the searches were undertaken, Sutherland
v. United States, 92 F.2d 305 (C.A.4th, 1937) (court apparently took judicial notice of state's
willingness to turn over evidence when federal violations were uncovered); Fowler v. United
States, 62 F.2d 656 (C.A. 7th, 1932); but see United States v. Haywood, 208 F.2d 156 (C.A.
7th, 1953) (defendant must prove not merely an established practice of cooperation, but an
agreement to make unlawful searches and seizures); cf. Rios v. United States, 256 F.2d 173
(C.A.9th, 1958) (even though California had acquitted defendant on basis of its exclusionary
rule, Government could secure conviction on same evidence). A mere "tip" from a federal officer
does not establish custom or cooperation, e.g., Shurman v. United States, 219 F.2d 282
(C.A.5th, 1955); Rent v. United States, 209 F.2d 893 (C.A.5th, 1954); Fredericks v. United
States, 208 F.2d 712 (C.A.5th, 1953); Scotti v. United States, 193 F.2d 644 (C.A.5th, 1952);
Sloane v. United States, 47 F.2d 889 (C.A.10th, 1931). Unilateral understanding by state officers that they were at liberty to refer cases to the Government, who might or might not accept
them, though this was frequently done, does not constitute sufficient cooperation, e.g., Kitt v.
United States, 132 F.2d 920 (C.A.4th, 1942). Sucl cases have given rise to the "silver platter"
doctrine, e.g., Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914); Gaitan v. United States, 252 F.2d
256 (C.A.10th, 1958) (search completed before federal officers told of violation or entered defendant's apartment); Andersen v. United States, 237 F.2d 118 (C.A.9th, 1956) (federal officer
gave phone number of Secret Service on request of state police after illegal search); Gallegos v.
United States, 237 F.2d 694 (C.A.10th, 1956); United States v. White, 228 F.2d 832 (C.A.7th,
1956); Jones v. United States, 217 F.2d 381 (C.A.8th, 1954); United States v. Stirsman, 212
F.2d 900 (C.A.7th, 1954); Shelton v. United States, 169 F.2d 665 (App. D.C., 1948). Cf.
Benanti v. United States, 355 U.S. 96 (1957).
1
c See The Benanti Case: State Wiretap Evidence and the Federal Exclusionary Rule, 57
Col. L. Rev. 1159, 1163-64 (1957).
17338 U.S. 25 (1949) (dictum). See Allen, The Wolf Case: Search and Seizure, Federalism,
and the Civil Liberties, 45 Ill. L. Rev. 1 (1950).
18The Court has since repeated its adherence to the view first announced in the Wolf case.
Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 132 (1954); Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117, 119 (1951).

1958]

COMMENTS

Amendment-protection against intrusion of privacy-is included in the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. That declaration weakens the
basis for admission in federal courts of evidence independently gathered by state
officers since the customary ground for receiving the evidence has been that no
part of the Federal Constitution was violated.19 Although the lower federal
courts have divided as to the impact of the Wolf case on the admissibility of such
state gathered evidence, 2 the most recently reported decision, Hanna v. United
States,21 has excluded in a federal court evidence independently gathered by
state officers in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Since state gathered evidence obtained in violation of the Federal Constitution is admissible in state courts,2 2 the deterrent effect on state officers of exclu-

sion of the same evidence in federal courts is negligible 2' The unavailability of a
strong deterrence rationale suggests that the Hannacase may indicate an unwillingness to permit the federal government to do indirectly what it cannot do directly-obtain a conviction based on illegally secured evidence. The implications of this interpretation for the self-incrimination cases are obvious. Even
though the use of a state grant of immunity for state purposes cannot be denominated an illegal method of obtaining evidence, the Hanna approach, if followed in the search and seizure cases,24 may yet invite the Court to foreclose
such circuitous routes of investigation to the federal government in the selfincrimination area even where there has been no federal-state "collusion."
In the Knapp case, however, even petitioner's reliance on the "collusion"
doctrine proved unavailing. Although the lower New York courts assumed that
the Feldman collusion limitation would protect Knapp against Federal prosecution on the basis of his testimony,25 the Supreme Court, while affirming the
19E.g., Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914).
2 Compare Hanna v. United States, 260 F.2d 723 (App. D.C., 1958), and Jones v. United
States, 217 F.2d 381 (C.A.8th, 1954), with United States v. Moses, 234 F.2d 127 (C.A.7th,
1956); United States v. White, 228 F.2d 832 (C.A.7th, 1956); Fredericks v. United States, 208
F.2d 712 (C.A.5th, 1953); Serio v. United States, 203 F.2d 576 (C.A.5th, 1953).
21260 F.2d 723 (App. D.C., 1958). Cf. Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 35 (1948), where the
Court, as an alternative ground for decision, refused to compel specific performance of a restrictive covenant in the District of Columbia because "[ilt is not consistent with the public
policy of the United States to permit federal courts in the Nation's capital to exercise general
equitable powers to compel action denied the state courts where such state action has been held
to be violative of the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws."
2 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
23 "Perhaps the sanction of excluding such evidence from federal trials has a greater deterrent effect upon federal officers than upon state officers. But there is no calculus to measure
such a difference, nor is it the kind of difference which warrants opposite conclusions as to the
admissibility of the evidence." Hanna v. United States, 260 F.2d 723, 728-29 (App. D.C.,
1958).
4
2 "It has remained an open question in this court whether evidence obtained solely by state
agents in an illegal search may be admissible in federal court despite the Fourth Amendment."
Benanti v. United States, 355 U.S. 96, 102 n.10 (1957).
25Knapp v. Schweitzer, 2 A.D.2d 579, 585, 157 N.Y.S.2d 158, 165 (1956), aff'd without
opinion 2 N.Y.2d 913, 141 N.E.2d 825 (1957).
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conviction, rejected the applicability of that doctrine to the Knapp case. Three
members of the Court, 27 urging that the state courts should have been corrected
on this point of federal law, wanted to remand the case for reconsideration.2 1
Had this procedure been followed, New York would have been faced with the
problem of deciding whether a grant of New York immunity would have been
sufficient to replace the scope of the New York privilege despite the fact that a
subsequent federal prosecution could be based on the testimony compelled
thereby or on possible leads from that testimony 2 9 A rational solution of this
problem presupposes a re-examination of the rationale for the privilege.
It is familiar learning that the privilege against self-incrimination is rooted in
the historic struggle of Englishmen against the use of the oath ex officio as an
interrogation technique and the all too frequent physical torture of the accused.30 Many conflicting explanations have been suggested for the privilege.
Bentham's classic challenge of the privilege urged that it is the result of a misplaced sentimentality3 and that it is a sort of "fair chance" given to the accused
resembling the Englishman's notion of sportsmanship. 2 Wigmore has suggested
that its main purpose at the trial stage is to encourage the police to engage in
more effective investigation as the basis for prosecution.33 However, Professor
Meltzer has persuasively suggested that the correct rationale for the privilege is
that it is a realistic recognition that not even the law can command the impossible result of requiring a criminal defendant to condemn himself by truthful
testimony.3 4 This justification rests on the law of self-preservation urged in the
Trial of Lilburn and Wharton:5 the law is humane enough to refrain from de26

26

Knapp v. Schweitzer, 357 U.S. 371 (1958).
27 Chief Justice Warren, Justices Black and Douglas dissenting, Knapp v. Schweitzer, 357
U.S. 371, 381, 382 (1958).
2s This procedure has occasionally been employed by the Court, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v.
Johnson, 316 U.S. 481 (1942).
21It is true that New York has held that its immunity statute need only protect against
New York prosecution, Dunham v. Ottinger, 243 N.Y. 423, 438, 154 N.E. 298, 302 (1926),

following Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906), and Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896). But
the decision seems based purely on precedent, and there is no attempt to examine the rationale
of the privilege. Even if New York would have decided the Knapp case the same way upon a
remand on the authority of the Dunham case, this possibility does not invalidate the text discussion that the crucial problem is one of the re-examination of the scope of the privilege by all
the states.
"Morgan, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 34 Minn. L. Rev. 1 (1949); Pittman,
The Colonial and Constitutional History of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in America, 21 Va. L. Rev. 763 (1935).
315 Bentham, Rationale of Judicial Evidence 207, 230-38 (1827).
3

Id., at 238.
18 Wigmore, Evidence §2251 (3d ed., 1940), at 309.
34
Meltzer, Required Records, The McCarran Act, and The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 18 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 687, 692-93 (1951).
353 How. St. Tr. 1315, 1332 (1637), quoted in Meltzer, id., at 692.
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manding that the defendant choose between "perjury, recalcitrance, or confession." 36The latter rationale applies not only to the privilege given to the criminal
defendant at the trial stage, but also to the state witness who, while testifying
under an immunity grant, still fears subsequent federal or sister-state prosecution. Thus, the self-preservation analysis implies that whenever the person being
questioned is offered the alternatives of perjury, recalcitrance, or confession, he
should be allowed to invoke the privilege. Three cases may be postulated to illustrate this hypothesis. In the first, the witness is not granted immunity. He does
not face the harsh alternatives because he may halt the line of inquiry by a
proper claim of the privilege as soon as he realizes that he may no longer respond
with safety. Nor is the witness placed in this position in the second case where
he is testifying under a grant of state immunity and he could fear only prosecution by the state making the grant. When a single sovereign is involved and
the witness' fear of prosecution is directed solely to that sovereign, the grant
of immunity removes the pressure on the witness by nullifying the threat of
prosecution which generated the pressure. In the second case the grant effectively replaces the scope of the privilege; for the witness is completely protected
by the immunity granted in exchange for his testimony. But, in the third case,
where the witness fears prosecution from two sovereigns and is granted immunity only by the inquiring sovereign, all of his fears are not allayed. 37 It is

submitted that a witness in the third case faces substantially the same impossible choice confronting a criminal defendant in the absence of the privilege.
Moreover, if such a witness is a suspect under grand jury or legislative investigation, he may be confronted with similar unpleasant alternatives: although the
state will not prosecute him, the federal government or a sister state may well
decide to do so. The state, in order to secure a quid pro quo for its immunity, will
seek to maximize the witness' disclosure. If he responds to the fear of prosecution from another jurisdiction, the self-preservation analysis suggests that recalcitrance or perjury may result. If he overcomes his fears, his truthful testimony will facilitate the preparation by the second sovereign of the case against
him. Thus, the Feldman rule may result in frustration of either the grant of
immunity, the privilege against self-incrimination, or possibly of both.
Accordingly, the rationale of self-preservation should operate to extend the
prosecution of the state privilege to the state witness who fears prosecution
either from the federal government or from a sister state.38 If the state privilege
31Meltzer, op. cit. supra note 34, at 393.

37"Feldman places a witness who is called before a state agency and ordered to testify in a
desperate position; he must either remain silent and risk state imprisonment for contempt or
confess himself into a federal penitentiary." Knapp v. Schweitzer, 357 U.S. 371, 384-85 (1958)
(Mr. Justice Black, dissenting).
18It should be noted that the administrative problems are different in the state-federal and
the state-state case. In the first case, the state court only has to discover the laws of one sovereign; in the second, the state may have to pass on the reasonableness of a claim of the privilege
according to any one of forty-eight other state laws and the federal law. Although this problem
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were interpreted to extend to a witness who reasonably feared subsequent prosecution from another sovereign, the state immunity statute would not displace
the privilege because the scope of the immunity must be co-extensive with the
scope of the privilege.39 Viewed in this light, the Court's ruling in Jack v.
Kansas4 that the immunity need only protect against prosecution by the jurisdiction making the inquiry seems too narrow because it cannot be squared with
a rational justification for the privilege. Local immunity is not in fact the
equivalent of the privilege when there is fear of prosecution outside the jurisdiction. Under existing constitutional law, such an interpretation of the state privilege is wholly a matter for state court determination free from the compulsion of
federal constitutional doctrine. By judicial decision Michigan and three states4'
following the "Michigan rule" have already so interpreted their privileges
against self-incrimination; at least one state by statute4 will not grant immunity
when it reasonably appears that the testimony which would be compelled might
subject the witness to prosecution under the laws of another state or of the
United States.
The "Michigan rule" reflects an awareness of the rationale of the privilege in
its recognition that subsequent federal use of state testimony would defeat the
purposes of the state privilege. Nevertheless, the majority in the Knapp case did
not choose to reconsider the Feldman holding that such subsequent federal use
is lessened in the states which have adopted the Uniform Proof of Statutes Act, 9A U.L.A. 246,
247 (1957), many states still require that the law of sister states be pleaded and proved, McCormick, Evidence §326 (1954). General provision for judicial notice in this situation would
appear to be a needed reform. Problems of extradition, not present in the state-federal case,
can arise in the state-state case. It is, of course, possible for a state to deny extradition of the
witness to a requesting state since the extradition provision, U.S. Const. Art. IV, sec. 2. ci. 2,
has been construed to be voluntary rather than mandatory, Kentucky v. Dennison, 24 How.
(U.S.) 66 (1861). But see the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, 9 U.L.A. 258 (1957). It has
been held, however, that the fact that a defendant was made amenable to the jurisdiction of
the prosecuting state by kidnapping does not nullify the conviction, Frisbie v. Collins, 342
U.S. 519 (1952), Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886).
9 Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892) (construing a federal immunity statute by
the standard of the Fifth Amendment); Jack v. Kansas, 199 U.S. 372 (1905) (construing a
state immunity statute by the standard of the Fourteenth Amendment).
40 199 U.S. 372 (1905).
4 Florida, Kentucky and Louisiana. State v. Kelly, 71 So.2d 887 (Fla.Sup.Ct., 1954);
Commonwealth v. Rhine, 303 S.W.2d 301 (Ky.Ct. of App., 1957); State ex rel Doran v. Doran,
215 La. 151, 39 So.2d 894 (1949); People v. Den Uyl, 318 Mich. 645, 29 N.W.2d 284 (1947);
cf. State v. Dominquez, 228 La. 284, 82 So.2d 12 (1955) (holding a witness may invoke the
federal Fifth Amendment in the state court when the danger stems from the federal government). All these cases extend the protection of the state privilege only when the state witness
can show substantial or imminent peril of prosecution by the second sovereign. The majority
of states do not follow this rule. See 8 Wigmore, Evidence §2258 (3d. ed., 1940); McCormick,
Evidence §124 (1954).
4Illinois.
Ill. Rev. Stat. c. 38 §580a (1957). Illinois added this provision to the Model State
Witness Immunity Act, 9C U.L.A. 186 (1957). For an interpretation of the Illinois statute, see
People v. Burkert, 7 Ill.2d 506, 131 N.E.2d 495 (1955).
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of the state testimony would not impair the purposes of the Fifth Amendment.
Mr. Chief Justice Warren observed, however, that "a satisfactory solution
cannot be reached without a reconsideration of that decision" 43 and Mr. Justice
Brennan, concurring, explicitly stated his opinion that the Knapp decision did
44
not foreclose reconsideration of Feldman.
Such reconsideration, presumably, would deal with at least three possible
solutions. Perhaps the most obvious choice is to retain the Feldman rule. At
least one commentator has remarked that "it is hard to see how any different holding could be justified. ' 45 Yet, in view of the criticisms of the Feldman
rule" and the doubts of some members of the present Court, 47 such a facile solution of the problem appears unlikely. As explained by Mr. Justice Frankfurter,48 the Feldman result is the "price of federalism. ' 49 But plainly the position of the witness under a set of doctrines which treats each of the sovereigns as
if it were the only one involved seems incompatible with a meaningful rationale
for the privilege. The view that the two sovereigns are entirely separate in their
respective spheres cannot obscure the fact that, in the federal-state case, both
act upon the same citizen. The federalist concept does not operate to remove the
state witness' fear of subsequent federal prosecution. Moreover, it may be
doubted that the sharp separation of power envisaged by classical federalism
accords with the actuality of modern federalism. It is often the case that both
sovereigns may desire to prosecute the actor for different aspects of the same
series of acts ° Furthermore, in some cases, such as the federal gambling tax, the
federal law has no other real purpose save to aid the states in enforcing their own
laws.51 Finally, the praiseworthy day-to-day cooperation of the Federal Bureau
Knapp v. Schweitzer, 357 U.S. 371, 382 (1958).

13

44Id., at 381.
45

McCormick, Evidence §124, at p. 261 n.14 (1954).

46See authorities cited in note 7 supra.
47

Feldman was a 4-3 decision. Two of the dissenters, Justices Black and Douglas, are still
on the Court. Mr. Chief Justice Warren and Mr. Justice Brennan expressed their doubts in
their opinions in the Knapp case. See notes 43 and 44 supra.
48 Knapp v. Schweitzer, 357 U.S. 371, 375-80 (1958); Feldman v. United States, 332 U.S.
487, 490-91 (1944).
41Knapp v. Schweitzer, 357 U.S. 371, 380-81 (1958).
10Itmay be argued that a distinction should be drawn between those cases in which the
primary interest is federal and those in which the primary interest is local. In part, such a distinction has already been drawn. That is, it has been held that the federal government may
grant an immunity binding on the states, Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956), and
the lower courts have construed that holding as limited to cases involving the national security, Tedesco v. United States, 255 F.2d 35,39 (C.A.6th, 1958). However, itis clear that the
states lack power to bind the federal government when the state interest is paramount. But it
would seem that a stronger argument could be made for extending federal comity to state
immunity grants where the primary interest is a state one.
51Cf. United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22 (1953).
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of Investigation and other federal agencies with state law enforcement bodies is
a common illustration of the power of the states and federal government united
against the criminal. 2 It would seem that the Feldman view of the two isolated
sovereigns not only fails to take account of the practical workings of modern
federalism, but also fails to give full scope to the rationale of the privilege.
Another approach to the Feldman problem would bar admission of the state
testimony and its fruits in the federal courts while allowing a federal prosecution
of the state witness based upon independently obtained evidence. This approach would avoid the criticism of the classical federalists: the federal government would not be prevented from prosecution by the state grant; it would
merely be deprived of an evidentiary windfall. Indeed, the proposed solution
could be effected in two ways. The Supreme Court could either interpret the
Fifth Amendment to bar the admission of all self-incriminating testimony extracted by the use of a state immunity statute53 or it could exclude such testi-

mony through its power to supervise the administration of federal justice. 4 But
despite stringent application of the "fruits of the poisonous tree" doctrine, it
seems clear that once the prosecuting jurisdiction was informed of the state
testimony some clues could be gleaned therefrom. Absent proper allocation of
the burden of proof as to the source of the evidence,5 the witness would, to some
extent, have aided in his own prosecution. In any event, fearing that result, the
witness might prefer perjury or recalcitrance to reliance on the "poisonous
fruits" doctrine. On the other hand, the Court, through its desire to protect the
52

Allen, The Supreme Court, Federalism, and State Systems of Criminal Justice, 8 U. of
Chi. L.S. Rec. 3 (1958). Professor Allen, after mentioning the Mann Act, the Harrison Act, the
Dyer Act, the Lindbergh Law and the Fugitives from Justice Act, concluded as follows: "This
legislation, in the most direct and significant fashion, introduced federal personnel and federal
power into the area of even routine law-enforcement.... The importance of training programs
for state police officers, conducted by such agencies as the Federal Bureau of Investigation and
the Narcotics Bureau, and the service functions of federal agencies, such as the maintenance of
fingerprint files and scientific aids to detection available to state law enforcement, should not
be underestimated. The net result of thesefederal activities has been to renderwholly inadequatethe
traditionalconcept of rigidseparation of federal and state powers in criminallaw enforcement. On
the contrary, a new system of cooperative federalism has appeared, the full significance of
which has not been grasped by the public at large and, indeed, has only begun to-be appreciated
by many persons professionally engaged in law-enforcement functions." (Italics added.)
53 Feldman v. United States, 322 U.S. 487,496-97 (1944) (Mr. justice Black, dissenting).
54Examples of the Court's use of this power are Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383
(1914) (federal exclusionary rule of evidence gained by an illegal search and seizure conducted
by federal officers), and McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943) (announcing the federal
"speedy arraignment" rule). If the Court were to adopt a similar exclusionary rule for state
compelled immunity testimony, presumably the decision would not have the status of a Constitutional determination.
51It may be suggested that the prosecution should be made to carry this burden because of
its superior access to the evidence. The witness would first be required to prove that the
prosecution had been informed of the testimony, and such proof would cause the burden of
showing that the testimony had not been used in any way to shift. For an analysis of this problem, see The Use of State-Compelled, Self-Incriminating Testimony in Federal Courts, 68 Yale
L. J. 322 (1958).
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defendant, might find links between the state testimony and the prosecution's
evidence where none existed in fact.
A third solution to the Feldman problem would appear to rest with the policy
branch of the prosecuting forum-be it the federal government or a sister state.
The prosecuting attorney could be empowered to respect the state grants of
immunity by refusing to use the testimony or its fruits in the investigation or
prosecution of the witness for the matters to which the questions related. If the
states adopted the "Michigan rule," extension of comity by the prosecuting
forum would be necessary only in cases where the witness had not been able to
establish a reasonable apprehension of future prosecution. However, comity
could be extended to a state which followed the majority view as to the scope of
the state privilege; if this were done, the witness would be adequately protected
against the use of his testimony by the prosecuting forum.
If reconsideration of the Feldman decision would lead to the exclusion of state
compelled testimony in federal courts, the harsh effect of the Knapp case on the
witness' position would be lessened. Without such reconsideration, the impact of
Knapp cannot be mitigated, unless a persuasive ground for overruling it can be
found. The suggestion of the Knapp case that the witness could claim the Fifth
Amendment in a state court if he could prove federal participation in procuring
the grant of immunity" offers the barest minimum of protection because of the
difficulty of securing such proof. 7 Nor is the argument that the Supreme Court

should have solved the Knapp problem by using the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to impose the "Michigan rule" on the states a sound
one. That argument employs the coerced confession rule as an analogy. The
Court has held that a state conviction based on a confession coerced by physical
violence, 8 psychological pressure, 9 or long periods of illegal detention 0 violates
the Due Process Clause. The coerced confession rule is designed to achieve at
least two objectives: maintenance of the "fair trial" standard by excluding
unreliable evidence and deterrence of improper methods of police investigation.
Since a similar explanation may be given for the historic justification of the
6Knapp v. Schweitzer, 357 U.S. 371, 380 (1958). It may be argued that if the witness can
prove sufficient cooperation before testifying to enable him to invoke the federal privilege in
the state proceedings, he could also use the same proof to prevent a subsequent prosecution
based upon that testimony. Yet it is apparent that, given only a choice as to which point in
time the cooperation proof should be used, the witness would strongly prefer to remain silent.
He is well advised to do so, for no matter how stringent an exclusionary rule is used to effectuate
the cooperation limitation there remains a risk that the prosecution will gain important leads
from the testimony.
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The Use of State-Compelled, Self-Incriminating Testimony in Federal Courts, 68 Yale
L. J. 322, 326-34 (1958).
IsBrown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940);
White v. Texas, 310 U.S. 530 (1940).
"0Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949).
,0 Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944).
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privilege against self-incrimination, ' there would seem to be some connection
between coerced confessions and the privilege. It is, accordingly, arguable that
since coerced confessions are prohibited under the Due Process Clause, it would
appear that some elements of the privilege are also included in that clause.
Moreover, so runs the argument, even if the foregoing analysis is not completely
persuasive, the factual similarities of the coerced confession and the testimony
compelled under a grant of immunity are close enough so that the latter should
be viewed as a coerced confession when the witness is faced with subsequent
prosecution."
Under existing doctrine, the obstacles to such an argument would appear to
be insurmountable. The analogy between a coerced confession with its overtones
of physical violence inherent in a back room atmosphere and the orderly procedure surrounding an immunity grant leaves much to be desired. Furthermore,
there are no Supreme Court cases holding that the federal government could not
use a state coerced confession in a federal prosecution, and it has been held that
one state may use a confession coerced by a sister state. 63 It is true that the Court
excluded from a federal trial a confession coerced by a foreign detective in a
foreign country, but the crime was committed aboard an American vessel on the
high seas, and the coercion took place while the defendant was being held under
the direction of the American consul.6 But the most serious difficulty with the
due process argument is that it runs counter to established precedent. The
Court has declared that the privilege against self-incrimination is neither a
privilege or immunity of federal citizenship under the Fourteenth Amendment
nor a component of due process." Indeed, the Court has suggested (although one
may doubt whether the present Court would agree) that a state could repeal its
own privilege against self-incrimination without violating the Fourteenth
Amendment.6 If the plight of a criminal defendant stripped of the privilege does
81 See

note 30 supra.

62

Knapp v. Schweitzer, 357 U.S. 371, 384 n.2 (1958) (Mr. Justice Black, dissenting).

63Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55 (1951). It is true that the Texas coerced confession was

verified by Nebraska before Gallegos was charged with murder, id., at 69, and it may be argued
that neither the unreliability nor the deterrence explanations were present in this case since
exclusion of the confession in the Nebraska proceedings would not deter the Texas police from
future violations. Thus the precedent value of this case may be weakened by arguing that the
rule was not applied because the reasons which support the rule were absent.
6
4Braim v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897). The Court does not discuss the two sovereignties problem.
6
5Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 99, 112-14 (1908) ("for the reasons given, we think
that the exemption from compulsory self-incrimination in the courts of the States is not secured
by any part of the Federal Constitution," id., at 114), reaffirmed in Palko v. Connecticut, 302
U.S. 319, 323, 325 (1937); Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 42, 53 (1947); and Knapp v.
Schweitzer, 357 U.S. 371, 374 (1958) (as to privileges and immunities only). See McCormick,
Evidence §121 (1954).
66Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 112-13 (1908); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 3,19,
323-24 (1937) ("The Fifth Amendment provides also that no person shall be compelled in any
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not violate the notion of "ordered liberty," a fortiorori, the plight of a witness
testifying under a grant of immunity would not violate that notion.
Plainly, any solution involves a sacrifice of either the freedom of each sovereign or of the scope of the privilege against self-incrimination. And there is no
formula by which those who believe that the privilege is an important safeguard
of human rights can demonstrate its value. Yet the position of a witness who
reasonably fears federal prosecution is an unenviable one which should invite
serious reflection about the Feldman rule and its "price of federalism" rationale.
Perhaps the best solution would be a three-part state-federal one: overruling of
the Feldman case by the Supreme Court; acceptance by the states of the interpretation of the privilege suggested by the "Michigan rule;" and voluntary extension of comity by the prosecuting sovereign to immunity grants in those cases
where the state witness had been unable to demonstrate the threat of subsequent
prosecution and therefore testified before the state proceedings.
criminal case to be a witness against himself. This Court has said that, in prosecutions by a
state, the exemption will end if the state elects to end it. Twining v. New Jersey..
67 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).

